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Misconstruing Size of Economic Impacts as the Determinant
of Penn Central Test Does Not Invoke Average Reciprocity of
Advantage
William W. Wade, Ph.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. SIEGEL 2012 INVOKED A “ROBUST PARCEL AS A WHOLE”
III. SIEGEL 2013 MISCONSTRUED “SEVERITY OF ECONOMIC IMPACT” AS A
SIZE OF LOSS ISSUE RATHER THAN A MISSING DENOMINATOR
IV. TAHOE-SIERRA PROVIDES NO THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR MEASURING
SEVERITY OF ECONOMIC IMPACT
V. SEVERITY OF ECONOMIC IMPACT IS MEASURED BY INTERFERENCE WITH
INVESTMENT BACKED EXPECTATIONS—NOT BY THE SIZE OF THE LOSS
VI. RECIPROCAL BENEFITS ARE MEASURED IN CONCRETE TERMS FROM
THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE IN TAKINGS CASES
VII. PENN CENTRAL INVOKED A BROADER CONCEPT OF RECIPROCITY
VIII. IN FLORIDA ROCK, THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DIRECTED THE CLAIMS COURT
TO EVALUATE DIRECT COMPENSATING BENEFITS
IX. ECONOMIC RIGOR WILL IMPROVE CONSIDERATIONS OF AVERAGE
RECIPROCITY OF ADVANTAGE
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I. Introduction
This article responds to two recent publications by Daniel L. Siegel1:
(1) Evaluating Economic Impact in Regulatory Takings Cases, published in 2013 in
the Hastings West-Northwest Journal of Environmental Law and Policy;2 and (2) its
companion article concerning Penn Central’s parcel-as-a-whole rule, How the
History and Purpose of Regulatory Takings Doctrine Help to Define the Parcel as a Whole,
published in 2012 in the Vermont Law Review.3
I discuss the economic aspects of Siegel’s two articles as they relate to
the Penn Central test.4 Penn Central created two ironclad requirements for
finding a regulatory taking: (1) the Penn Central test and (2) the principle of
valuing the “parcel as a whole.”5 The Penn Central test dictates that courts
must examine and balance three factors before requiring compensation: (1)
the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to

* The author is an economist who has testified as an expert in regulatory
takings cases, lectured at CLE seminars, and written numerous articles about the
economic underpinnings of the Penn Central test, including one article directly onpoint to discuss Siegel’s extrapolation of the phrase, “average reciprocity of
advantage.” See William W. Wade & Robert L. Bunting, Average Reciprocity of Advantage:
“Magic Words” or Economic Reality: Lessons from Palazzolo, 39 URB. LAW 319, 319 (2007). The
author testified as a financial expert for Plaintiff Anthony Palazzolo in the Rhode
Island state trial upon remand from the U.S. Supreme Court and estimated the
reciprocal benefits as part of that testimony. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297,
2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 05, 2005).
Thanks to the law journal editors, whose careful editorial assistance
corrected legal shortcomings, improved readability, and, of course, Bluebooked the
article to a level of correctness that wildly exceeded the economist-author’s
imagined understanding of citation. Remaining errors are the authors.
1.

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, California Department of Justice.

2. Daniel L. Siegel, Evaluating Economic Impact in Regulatory Takings Cases, 19
HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 373 (2013).
3. Daniel L. Siegel, How the History and Purpose of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine
Help to Define the Parcel as a Whole, 36 VT. L. REV. 603 (2012).
4. Thousands of words by hundreds of litigators and scholars including the
author have sought to explicate the Penn Central test. See, e.g., William W. Wade,
Temporary Takings, Tahoe Sierra, and The Denominator Problem, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10189 (2013).
5. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York (Penn Central), 438 U.S. 104, 124,
130–31 (1978).
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which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the government regulation.6
While the Court categorized the balancing test as an “ad hoc factual
analysis,”7 two of the Penn Central prongs entail fact-specific economic
analyses that must conform to standard peer-reviewed methods. Daubert
standards require at a minimum that an expert uses the appropriate analytic
techniques that have been tested in actual situations and peer reviewed.8
In regulatory takings cases, economic losses must be measured
against the “parcel as a whole.”9 This comparison has come to be known as
the “takings fraction,”10 which compares the with and without regulation
values, as the numerator, to the owner’s stake in the entire property, as the
denominator, to evaluate the severity of economic impact.11 For partial or
temporary takings that involve lost income, the parcel-as-a-whole rule
requires that the severity of the economic loss be evaluated in relation to
the owner’s entire investment in the property as a whole.12 A claimant’s
investment is consistent with the notion of the parcel-as-a-whole when
income, rather than access to real property, is at the heart of the litigation.
The economic prongs of the Penn Central test, when properly measured
and evaluated, provide standard financial benchmarks, which reveal when

6.

Id. at 124.

7.

Id.

8.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702.

9. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31. The Supreme Court first enunciated the
parcel-as-a-whole rule in Penn Central to examine how to analyze the significance of
New York City’s denial of the permit to build an office tower above the Grand Central
Terminal. Id. The Court corrected the lower court’s notion that the parcel included
profits earned from an agglomeration of all the property owned by Penn Central in the
vicinity—hotels, office buildings, and other valuable real estate. See Penn Central, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1276 (N.Y. 1977).
10. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. Debenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)
(“Because our test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has
been taken from the property with the value that remains in the property, one of the
critical questions is determining how to define the unit of property ‘whose value is to
furnish the denominator of the fraction.’” (emphasis added)).
11. For more about the history and purpose of denominator values, see Wade,
supra note 4.
12. Actually, Penn Central benchmarked the property taking to the “extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block designated
as the ‘landmark site.’” Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31.
199
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government action goes “too far,” as originally envisioned in Pennsylvania Coal
v. Mahon.13 Under Penn Central, government action has gone “too far” when
the claimant is no longer able to earn a “reasonable return” on her
investment in the property as a whole.

II. Siegel 2012 Invoked a “Robust Parcel as a Whole”
Siegel’s 2012 article concluded that the United States Supreme Court
should elaborate upon Penn Central’s parcel-as-a-whole rule.14 He called for a
robust parcel-as-a-whole rule that not only would include “the entire
temporal property interest, including the owner’s future interest in the
property,” but also would comprise the owner’s entire “horizontal” interest.15
The Federal Circuit has already imposed the temporal parcel-as-a-whole rule
in Cienega X.16
Cienega X relied on Tahoe-Sierra to invoke “the impact on the value of the
property as a whole [a]s an important consideration [in a temporary taking],
just as it is in the context of a permanent regulatory taking.”17 The Cienega X
decision adopted Tahoe-Sierra’s parcel-as-a-temporal-whole.18 The court

13. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“The general rule at least
is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking.”).
14.

Siegel, supra note 3, at 609, 615–21.

15. Id. at 618 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002)).
16. Cienega Gardens v. United States (Cienega X), 503 F.3d 1266, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
2007). Cienega X was one of a series of lost income temporary takings case where
owners of dozens of Department of Housing and Urban Development low income
apartment investments were denied the opportunity to convert to market values at
the end of a twenty year contract period, as expected. First, claimants filed contract
claims. Subsequently, they filed takings claims to recover damages. The Federal
Circuit awarded damages to some of the original claimants, Cienega Gardens v.
United States (Cienega VIII), 331 F.3d 1319, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003), and denied damages
to others, Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1291. Each set of claimants proffered standard
empirical measurements of the Penn Central test, with similar showings of annual lost
return on investment.
17.

Cienega X, 503 F.3d at 1281 (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331, 355).

18. Id. at 1285 (“The duration of these restrictions is an important factor in the
takings analysis.” (citing Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 342)).
200
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proposed two possible ways “to compare the value of the restriction to the
value of the property as a whole”19:
First, a comparison could be made between the market value of
the property with and without the restrictions on the date that
the restriction began (the change in value approach). The other
approach is to compare the lost net income due to the restriction
(discounted to present value at the date the restriction was
imposed) with the total net income without the restriction over the entire
useful life of the property (again discounted to present value).20
Going further than the Cienega X court, Siegel’s 2012 article asserted that “[a]
robust parcel rule not only respects precedent and the Takings Clause’s
history; it also ensures that the public interest is included in the takings
calculus.”21 That article did not address how exactly to include the public
interest.

III. Siegel 2013 Misconstrued “Severity of Economic
Impact” as a Size of Loss Issue Rather than a Missing
Denominator
Siegel’s 2013 article reiterated his call for:
[R]ules that limit regulatory takings to extreme situations . . . [and]
generally require, among other things, a showing that a
regulation’s economic impact on property is severe, counting direct
benefits that the owner receives as part of the impact calculation,
and evaluating that impact by including potential future uses of
the property (the parcel as a whole).22

19.

Id. at 1282.

20.

Id. (emphasis added).

21.

Siegel, supra note 3, at 618.

22. Siegel, supra note 2, at 374 (emphasis added). This is akin to Professor
Echeverria’s notion of “the concept of reciprocity of advantage,” which he describes as
“the idea that regulations often simultaneously benefit and burden affected
owners . . . [and], considered in isolation, appear to seriously reduce the value of a
claimant’s property [but] may not in fact have any net adverse effect at all.” John D.
Echeverria, Partial Regulatory Takings Live, But . . . , in Taking Sides on Takings Issues:
The Impact of Tahoe Sierra 67, 72–73 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2003). Such a concept
“supports a law of regulatory takings that is confined to truly extreme cases.” Id.
201
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Siegel’s 2013 article discussed how to count direct benefits to the owner of
the regulation in context with Penn Central’s average reciprocity of
advantage.23
Penn Central never contemplated Siegel’s “extreme situation” criterion
and instead emphasized “reasonable return.”24 The phrase “reasonable
return” appears nineteen times, in the majority opinion and Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent, including footnotes.
The majority erroneously
concluded that Penn Central was earning a reasonable return on the Grand
Central terminal as part of its justification for denying the taking.25 The

23. Siegel, supra note 2, at 385–89; see also Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 139–140
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“But any such abstract decrease in value will more
than likely be at least partially offset by an increase in value which flows from similar
restrictions as to use on neighboring properties. All property owners in a designated
area are placed under the same restrictions, not only for the benefit of the
municipality as a whole but also for the common benefit of one another. In the
words of Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
there is an average reciprocity of advantage.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
24. Justice Rehnquist called attention to the majority’s lack of definition for
“reasonable return” and “economically viable” language and concluded that a rule
without definitions poses “difficult conceptual and legal problems.” Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The footnote appears to point out
politely that the majority was not schooled in the meanings of the economic terms
used in their language. Confusion about relevant financial evidence and its
interpretation has remained a fatal problem in regulatory takings cases since Justice
Rehnquist’s prescient remark.
25. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129 (“[T]he parcel of land occupied by Grand
Central Terminal must, in its present state, be regarded as capable of earning a
reasonable return . . . .”). It is hard to imagine how the Court determined that Penn
Central was earning a reasonable return. In 1970, Penn Central became the largest
bankruptcy in U.S. history. Metro North, a subsidiary of New York’s Metropolitan
Transit Authority (“MTA”), took over operation of Grand Central Terminal in 1983
under a lease from Penn Central. Metro North described their takeover of Grand
Central in 1983 as salvaging it from “the wreckage of Penn Central.” Grand Central
Terminal was eventually restored at public expense by the MTA.
The Court’s erroneous decision resulted from plaintiff counsel’s failure to rebut the
mistaken assumption. Beyond failure to introduce appropriate financial information,
no testimony is in the record about changing demographic and economic conditions
that resulted in less passenger travel and more freight movement on rails to the
detriment of Penn Central. The Penn Central Company needed the rental income
202

West

Northwest, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer 2015

Court reaffirmed Penn Central as its “polestar” in Lingle v. Chevron and did not
overturn Penn Central’s focus on “reasonable return.”
Under Penn Central, a regulation that denies an owner a reasonable
return on her investment would, in fact, be “so onerous that its effect is
tantamount to a direct appropriation or ouster.”26 In other words, if an
investor could have foreseen a particular regulatory outcome, she would
have moved her money elsewhere. Suffice to say, Siegel’s “extreme
situation” is a phrase lacking an economic definition, which amounts to a
value judgment and not an appropriate basis for a legal decision.
Siegel argued for a compound rule that “count[s] direct benefits that
the owner receives as part of the impact calculation, and evaluat[es] th[e]
[severity of economic] impact by including potential future uses of the
property (the ‘parcel as a whole’).”27 Siegel’s approach would increase the
already difficult evaluation of the Penn Central test. His dual standard
invokes the measurement of Penn Central’s reciprocal benefits to offset the
burdens of the regulatory constraint at issue,28 and adopts Tahoe-Sierra’s
concept of a parcel-as-a-temporal-whole as black-letter law.29
The temporal aspect of Tahoe-Sierra is an economic error, which I have
discussed elsewhere30 and will summarize in Part IV. This article focuses on
Siegel’s rationale for “counting direct benefits that the owner receives as
part of the [severity of economic] impact calculation.”31 Part V considers his

from the foreclosed building in the airspace above Grand Central. Perhaps, the Court
thought that people still “met under the clock at Grand Central” as in the movies.
The Penn Central decision brought forth the Penn Central test with no adequate
consideration of the economic prongs—without a Penn Central test.
26. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005) (citing Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
27.

Siegel, supra note 2, at 374.

28. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (explaining that finding a taking is less
likely “when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good” (emphasis added)).
29. Siegel, supra note 3, at 618 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)).
30. William W. Wade, Confusion about “Change in Value” and “Return on Equity”
Approaches to Penn Central Test in Temporary Takings, 38 ENVTL. L. Rep. NEWS & ANALYSIS
10486 (2008).
31.

Seigel, supra note 2, at 374.
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notions about including the public interest and weighing the benefits and
burdens of regulation.32

IV. Tahoe-Sierra Provides No Theoretical Support for
Measuring Severity of Economic Impact
The Tahoe-Sierra33 decision expanded Penn Central’s geographic parcel-asa-whole rule34 to include a temporal dimension to deny a regulatory taking.
The temporal aspect included “the term of years that describes the temporal
aspect of the owner’s interest”35 or the remaining life of the property. TahoeSierra rests on a basic misunderstanding of economic theory—time values of
money are at the heart of people’s investment decisions. Equating “metes
and bounds”36 of land areas to segments of time overlooks the fact that the
value of money is measured by time; lost income is not magically restored at
the end of a temporary taking. Time values of money differentiate temporal
segmentation of the parcel as a whole—per Tahoe-Sierra—from physical
segmentation. Returning the use of the property after a temporary taking
does not return income lost during that period.37
Tahoe-Sierra demonstrates a lack of understanding of the effect of
money’s time value on “economically viable use,”38 profitability, or

32. William W. Wade & Robert L. Bunting, Average Reciprocity of Advantage: “Magic
Words” or Economic Reality: Lessons from Palazzolo, 39 URB. LAW 319, 319 (2007). I draw
from that 2007 article regarding average reciprocity of advantage.
33. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 331. The temporal whole notion actually arose in
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg’l Planning Agency (TSPC IV), 216 F.3d 764, 776 (9th Cir. 2000) (shifting the focus
of the Tahoe dispute from the impact of Tahoe Regional Planning Authority’s
moratorium during its effective period to its impact over the entire useful life of the
subject properties).
34.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).

35.

Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 330.

36.

Id. at 331.

37. For more about the economic failings of Tahoe-Sierra’s “temporal whole” and
its progeny in the Federal Circuit Court, see Wade, supra note 4. Tahoe Sierra’s
temporal parcel confounded the Federal Circuit’s temporary takings decisions in
ways at odds with standard economic theory and practice. Cienega Gardens v.
United States, 503 F.3d 1266, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007); CCA Associates v. United States,
667 F.3d 1239, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
38. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Two years after Penn
Central, the Court in Agins applied a two-part legal test derivative of Penn Central to
204

West

Northwest, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer 2015

reasonable returns. The factors that are relevant to determine a property’s
value at a unique point in time are the uses and returns that can be made of
and earned by the property during that time. As touched upon in Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s Tahoe-Sierra dissent,39 the longer the imposed delay from
that time to the future uses, the lower the present value of the property’s
use to its owner.

V. Severity of Economic Impact is Measured by
Interference with Investment Backed Expectations—Not
by the Size of the Loss
Siegel misconstrued the economic intent of language in the Federal
Circuit’s Rose Acre III;40 this error facilitated the superimposing of his
“counting direct benefits” argument upon the Penn Central test. In his 2013
article, Siegel wrote, “for an economic impact to be so onerous that it is
similar to eliminating a core property interest, the impact has to be huge. As
the Federal Circuit has explained, a ‘severe economic deprivation’ is
therefore required by ‘the very nature of a regulatory takings claim.’”41 The
actual language from the decision aimed to discuss a lack of denominator
comparison and did not imply that “the impact has to be huge:”
[N]either the testimony nor the economic data cited by the trial
court appropriately gauge the severity of the economic impact of
the regulations on Rose Acre. The cited testimony is not specific to
Rose Acre, and the data divorced from any economic context
represents only the first step in the required [Penn Central]
analysis. Simply put, it is not possible to determine the

determine whether a regulatory taking had occurred. Id. Subsequently called the
Agins test, the Court held that a taking occurs if the regulation either does not
“substantially advance legitimate state interests,” or denies the property owner
“economically viable use” of the property. Id. A subsequent Court decision
eliminated the “substantially advance” element, but left the “economically viable”
language unchanged. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
39. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 351 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (discussing the
Tahoe claimants’ denial of all beneficial use of their properties for six years as the
basis for his conclusion that “the ‘temporary’ denial of all viable use of land for six
years is a taking”).
40. Rose Acre Farms v. United States (Rose Acre III), 373 F.3d 1177, 1195
(Fed. Cir. 2004).
41.

Siegel, supra note 2, at 377 (citing Rose Acre III, 373 F.3d at 1195).
205
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economic impact of a regulatory scheme applied to a private
actor without casting the appropriate absolute measures of the
effect of the regulation against the backdrop of relevant
indicators of the economic vitality of the actor.42
Rose Acre III explicitly disavowed using the absolute size of the impact (e.g.,
huge) as the appropriate basis for deciding against the plaintiff. The Federal
Circuit language cited by Siegel relates to prior discussion and the remand
instructions: “First, as noted above, courts have traditionally rejected takings
claims in the absence of severe economic deprivation.”43 This rejection
stems from the economic prongs of the Penn Central test—requiring not that
the loss be huge; rather, the loss must be benchmarked to some
denominator to understand whether investment-backed expectations have
been frustrated. The amount or percentage of the loss is not per se
dispositive.44 In Florida Rock V, the Federal Claims Court invoked language
from Penn Central to emphasize “the importance of obtaining a ‘reasonable
return’ on the property owner’s investment in determining the presence of a
taking.”45
Rose Acre III’s rejection of the trial court’s award of damages conforms
to standard financial practice. The trial court (in Rose Acre II) found in favor
of the plaintiff with no basis to gauge severity of the economic impact.46 The
plaintiff’s economist demonstrated substantial revenue losses, but never
benchmarked the losses to any denominator value. The Federal Circuit,
citing to both the plaintiff’s and the government’s testimony on losses,
determined succinctly that “[the economist’s] analysis was insufficient” and
“neither the testimony nor the economic data cited by the trial court
appropriately gauge the severity of the economic impact of the regulations on
Rose Acre.”47

42.

Rose Acre III, 373 F.3d at 1185.

43.

Id. at 1195.

44. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States (Florida Rock V), 45 Fed. Cl. 21, 41
(1999) (“Even though . . . a significant destruction of the value of plaintiff’s property
[occurred], it is not dispositive of the issue.” (emphasis added)). Further, “[i]n determining
the severity of the economic impact of permit denial, the court must take into account
whether Florida Rock was able to recoup its investment subject to the regulation.” Id. at 38.
This conforms to standard finance textbook theory and methods.

206
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Id. at 39 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 149 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).

46.

Rose Acre Farms v. United States (Rose Acre II), 55 Fed. Cl. 643 (2003).

47.

Rose Acre III, 373 F.3d at 1185.
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Opposing experts agreed on the amount of loss, but neither expert
provided a denominator value acceptable to the Federal Circuit or
consistent with standard economic theory. As such, the court remanded the
case “for reconsideration of the severity of the economic impact wrought by
the relevant . . . restrictions on Rose Acre, and for consideration of the
significance of that impact in light of the other relevant factors, [including]
the regulation’s interference with Rose Acre’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations.” 48
Over the last twenty-five years takings cases have consistently
evaluated the severity of economic impact in a comparative manner.49
Siegel’s vague and absolute standard for justifying compensation in a taking
claim is rhetoric that lacks economic meaning. His mistaken assertion
facilitates the objective of his argument. Requiring a “huge” economic
impact justifies Siegel’s claim that government restrictions and other
actions benefit property as well as burden it. However, he claims
quantifying the increased value of individual properties due to these
benefits is generally very difficult.
Therefore, a “huge” diminution
requirement accounts for the uncertain nature of the economic evaluation of
these benefits.50

48. Id. at 1195. Expert testimony and argument did not become any clearer
during the Rose Acre IV trial in the Federal Claims Court. Whether the temporary taking
case was about eggs or farms, gross revenues or net profits, lost income or lost value,
marginal costs or average costs apparently eluded the judges, the instant parties and
experts. Standard economic approaches are hopelessly muddled within all of the two
courts’ decisions. Both plaintiff and government economic testimony ignored standard
financial analysis and produced no relevant calculations to evaluate the investment
backed expectations prong of the Penn Central test. The interested reader will not find a
more economically confused record and decision than Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. United
States (Rose Acre IV), No. 92-710C, 2007 WL 5177409 (Fed. Cl. July 11, 2007), and Rose
Acre Farms, Inc. v. United States (Rose Acre V), 559 F.3d 1260, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
49. Comparisons based on the percent diminution of tangible asset values
have been common. However, in temporary takings cases that involve income
losses, such comparisons have been at odds with standard economic practice. See
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. Debenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987); see also
Wade, supra note 4, at 10195 n.67 (citing Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States
(Florida Rock II), 791 F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (identifying, for the first time in the
Federal Circuit, the correct economic notion of the taking fraction to evaluate
frustration of investment backed expectations)).
50.

Siegel, supra note 2, at 382.
207
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This requirement makes no more economic sense than going into
court with a tort claim for damages of a certain amount, plus some vague
additive amount to account for other losses and disappointments
experienced in the plaintiff’s life. With millions of dollars in investment and
personal aspirations at stake in takings cases, counsel should present hard
economic evidence of regulatory benefits and burdens to courts, instead of
vague arguments or political beliefs. If either plaintiff’s or defendant’s
counsel desires to invoke Penn Central’s average reciprocity of advantage, the
relevant elements should be based on quantifiable evidence.
Estimating the distribution of the benefits and burdens of any
regulation is the bailiwick of economics. Economists are qualified to
estimate whether “some public program [merely adjusts] the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good,”51 or if it
disproportionately slams a few selected property owners. Hard evidence of
regulatory impacts is as relevant to a court’s discerning whether reciprocal
benefits govern the legal decision as the benefits and costs to state and
federal agencies guided by Executive Order 12,866.52

VI. Reciprocal Benefits are Measured in Concrete Terms
from their First Appearance in Takings Cases
From its first appearance, the reciprocal benefits element of
regulations in takings law has required concrete evaluations.53 Plymouth
Coal54 and Jackman55 established average reciprocity in case law by evaluating
the directly offsetting benefits and burdens of the regulatory requirement.
Specific concrete benefits to the claimants were identified in both cases—
e.g., mutual boundary walls that enhanced safety and provided other
specific services to the property. In both cases, the burden was deemed less
than the benefit of requiring the mutual walls and the courts ruled against
the claimant.56
Jackman involved the maintenance of a common wall between two
properties, which was of mutual benefit to both, due to safety and the

51.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.

52. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2012) (requiring significant regulatory actions to be submitted to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget for review).

208

53.

Wade, supra note 32, at 325.

54.

Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 541 (1914).

55.

Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).

56.

Plymouth Coal, 232 U.S. at 540; Jackman, 260 U.S. at 32.
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economic advantage of sharing the wall to support both buildings.57 Justice
Holmes first used the phrase “average reciprocity of advantage” in Jackman.58
Subsequently, in Pennsylvania Coal, Justice Holmes applied the phrase to the
earlier Plymouth Coal decision to describe how a “pillar of coal . . . left along
the line of adjoining property” acted as a barrier for the safety of the mine
employees and “secured an average reciprocity of advantage.”59 After
determining that the benefits of requiring the mutual walls outweighed the
burdens, the court ruled against the plaintiffs’ taking claim.60

VII. Penn Central Invoked a broader Concept of Reciprocity
The phrase “average reciprocity of advantage” next appeared half a
century later in Justice Rehnquist’s Penn Central dissent.61 Rehnquist’s
argument was consistent with Plymouth Coal and Jackman, which both
required reciprocity to be evaluated by focusing on the direct benefits
specifically affecting the regulated parties. Justice Rehnquist expressly
argued that reciprocity of advantage is not satisfied where the benefits flow
to the general public.62
The Penn Central majority concluded otherwise:
[T]he application of New York City’s Landmarks Law has not
effected a “taking” of appellants’ property. The restrictions
imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the
general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of
the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further
to enhance [the Terminal] . . . .63

57.

Jackman, 260 U.S. at 31.

58.

Id. at 30.

59. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (citing Plymouth Coal, 232
U.S. 531 (holding that the burden to the plaintiffs did not exceed the benefit of
requiring the mutual walls)).
60.

Plymouth Coal, 232 U.S. at 540.

61.

Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 140 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

62. Id. at 148–49 (“The benefits that appellees believe will flow from
preservation of the Grand Central Terminal will accrue to all the citizens of New York
City. . . . [A]ppellees would impose the entire cost of several million dollars per year
on Penn Central. But it is precisely this sort of discrimination that the Fifth
Amendment prohibits.”).
63. Id. at 138 (emphasis added). Given that Penn Central ceased to exist as a
railroad in 1976 and was being operated as Conrail under federal bankruptcy
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The majority found that “the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York
citizens and all structures, both economically and by improving the quality
of life in the city as a whole” and, as a consequence, the Landmarks Law
benefited the Terminal’s owners.64 The focus on broad benefits to the
general public allows subjective results, perhaps influenced by politics.65

VIII. In Florida Rock, the Federal Circuit Directed the Claims
Court to Evaluate Direct Compensating Benefits
Reciprocity surfaced as an important element in the Florida Rock line of
cases, specifically Florida Rock IV, in which the Federal Circuit Court
emphasized the narrow alignment of benefits and burdens,66 and Florida Rock
V, in which the Court of Federal Claims analyzed reciprocal benefits and the
plaintiff’s burden.67 In Florida Rock IV, the Federal Circuit remanded the case
to the Federal Claims Court to deal with reciprocity in the original sense,
i.e., to evaluate whether direct compensatory benefits to the property offset
the requirement to compensate the property owner:
In addition, then, to a demonstration of loss of economic use to
the property owner as a result of the regulatory imposition . . .
the trial court must consider: are there direct compensating benefits
accruing to the property, and others similarly situated, flowing
from the regulatory environment? Or are benefits, if any, general
and widely shared through the community and the society, while
the costs are focused on a few?68

protection at the time of the 1978 decision, I wonder what funds the Court imagined
might be used for these further enhancements. Ironically, Grand Central Terminal
was eventually restored at public expense. This factual outcome speaks more about
the lack of economic insight in the Penn Central decision than thousands of words
since in erudite journals.
64.

Id. at 134–35.

65. Political considerations are beyond the author’s expertise, but seemingly
present in the original Penn Central decision. For more on the politics, see Gideon
Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter Century Retrospective on Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 653 (2005).
66. Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States (Florida Rock IV), 18 F.3d 1560 (Fed.
Cir.1994).
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Florida Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (Fed. Cl. 1999).

68.

Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d at 1570–71 (emphasis added).
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Upon remand, Judge Loren Smith wrote the watershed Florida Rock V
decision.69 In applying the economic impact prong of Penn Central, he
specifically contrasted “diminution in value” with “reciprocity of advantage”
as two separate parts of the economic impact.70 The decision threads its
way through the Penn Central language regarding benefits to the community
as well as the original formulation of average reciprocity, which dealt
exclusively with evaluating the direct offsetting benefits of a regulation
required to avoid payment of compensation:
Here, the surrounding community benefits from the wetland’s
filtering action, stabilizing effect, and provision of habitat for
flora and fauna. Florida Rock benefits from being a member of a
community which has the potential for a better environment.
But there can be no question that Florida Rock has been singled
out to bear a much heavier burden than its neighbors, without
reciprocal advantages. . . . The court finds that Florida Rock’s
disproportionately heavy burden was not offset by any reciprocity
of advantage.71

IX. Economic Rigor will Improve Considerations of Average
Reciprocity of Advantage
Average reciprocity of advantage has been interpreted narrowly,
following Florida Rock IV’s “reciprocity of advantage test” as labeled by the
Alaska Supreme Court,72 and broadly, following Justice Brennan’s
application of Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Pennsylvania Coal.73 Siegel and
other government counsel argue for broader consideration of societal

69. Florida Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. 21. This pathbreaking decision applied the Penn
Central test to a partial taking and corrected the denominator value in the takings
fraction to be the owner’s equity or investment in the property, not the “value before”
as mistakenly advanced in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. Debenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 497 (1987).
70.

Florida Rock V, 45 Fed. Cl. at 36–37.

71.

Id.

72. See R&Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 299 (Alaska 2001) (internal
quotations omitted).
73. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979) (“a burden borne to secure ‘the
advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community’” (quoting Pa. Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))) .
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benefits from the regulation at issue as a benefit to the plaintiff to offset the
instant loss that prompted the lawsuit.74
Economic efficiency grounds dictate consideration of directly
offsetting benefits to deny compensation.75 Case law has set forth concrete,
measurable issues, which various courts have evaluated with greater or
lesser understanding. Unlike the extensive literature about the Penn Central
test, a paucity of legal scholarship exists on the topic.76
In 2005, I testified in the Palazzolo remand trial.77 My testimony
reported that Palazzolo’s single buildable lot in Westerly, Rhode Island,
received direct compensating values when a change in the regulations
denied development of his surrounding seventeen acres of wetlands. The
resulting amenity value to his buildable property was $119,000, which was
sharply less than the claimed loss of $3,150,000.78 The opposing economist
opined about the social values to surrounding properties of preserving the
salt marsh and maintaining lower density, but provided no numerical
values.79 The benefits of preserving the salt marsh, if it had been shown to
be substantial in terms of public-policy value to society, would have been an
economic reason to compensate Palazzolo and defray his cost of providing
the social benefits to residents of Westerly.
Apparently with an eye toward the vagaries of the range of
understanding and estimation of the reciprocal benefits, Siegel eschews any

74. Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic
Trend in Regulatory Takings, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 64 (2004) (espousing a
theory of takings jurisprudence based on his view of reciprocity of advantage:
“Takings should accordingly be limited to those narrow cases where the claimant
proves a categorical taking and the complete absence of reciprocity, not just from the
regulation in question, but from the whole system of applicable economic
regulations, of which the particular regulation is just a part.”).
75.

Wade, supra note 32, at 352.

76. For the best from the limited scholarship, see Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of
the “Harm/Benefit” and “Average Reciprocity of Advantage” Rules in a Comprehensive Takings
Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449, 1489 (1997).
77. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct.
July 05, 2005).
78. Wade, supra note 32, at 357. The lower court found that the remaining
“economically beneficial” use of the Palazzolo property was one residential lot. This
lot was surrounded by approximately seventeen acres of protected open space,
which the state’s appraiser valued at $7,000 per acre for their scenic contribution to
the residential lot.
79.
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attempt to identify the exact offsetting benefits at issue and concludes that
because they are “difficult to measure, therefore [they should be] accounted
for by the major diminution in value requirement.”80 This vague standard
would allow defendant counsel and the judiciary to opine to suit themselves
about “how huge is huge enough.”81
Infusing economic rigor into measurement of “average reciprocity of
advantage” would reduce part of the vexation surrounding the Penn Central
test.82 Under takings case law, an economist can interpret reciprocity to
discover if positive externalities of the regulation benefit the owner’s
remaining uses of the property sufficiently to offset instant losses.
Following the Federal Circuit’s reciprocity of advantage test, an economist
would evaluate whether “direct compensating benefits accruing to the
property, and others similarly situated, flow from the regulatory
environment,” or whether the “benefits [are] general and widely shared
through the community . . . while the costs are focused on a few.”83
Economists have been involved in measuring benefits and costs of
government policies for decades. Economic support clearly exists to bolster
government counsel’s presentation of direct offsetting benefits to mitigate
or overcome plaintiff’s demand for compensation. Economic methods to
estimate these offsetting benefits are not only available, but contradict
Siegel’s belief that these estimates are “generally very difficult . . . [and]
therefore best captured by simply requiring the plaintiff to establish a large
economic impact.”84 This economically flawed value judgment would further
confound regulatory takings’ already confused understanding of its
economic underpinnings.

80.

Siegel, supra note 2, at 385.

81. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (discussing a variant of
this phrase: “The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” (emphasis added)).
82. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (“The Penn Central
factors—though each has given rise to vexing subsidiary questions—have served as
the principal guidelines for resolving regulatory takings claims that do not fall within
the physical takings or Lucas rules.” (emphasis added)).
83.

Florida Rock IV, 18 F.3d 1560, 1571 (1994) (emphasis added).

84.

Siegel, supra note 2, at 382.
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